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Background
The United States, Canada, and 
Japan are the only industrialized 
countries that do not provide universal 
access to paid sick leave. In these 
countries, sick pay is largely provided 
as a fringe benefit by employers on a 
voluntary basis (Heymann et al. 2010). 
In the United States, coverage rates are 
around 65 percent among full-time 
workers; low-income, part-time, and 
service sector workers have coverage 
rates of less than 20 percent (Susser 
and Ziebarth 2016). In a given week of 
the year, Susser and Ziebarth (2016) 
estimate that the total demand for paid 
sick leave sums to 10 percent of the 
workforce in the United States. 
To date, sick leave legislation has 
been passed in 11 states, the District of 
Columbia, and dozens of cities across 
the United States.1 They require that 
employees must have the right to earn, 
accumulate, and take sick days, typically 
up to seven days per year. Some critics 
are concerned that these mandates 
cause substantial wage reductions for 
employees, as well as job losses. Upjohn 
Early Career Research Awardee Nicolas 
R. Ziebarth of Cornell University and 
colleague Stefan Pichler of ETH Zurich 
published an examination of these sick 
pay mandates in the Journal of Human 
Resources (forthcoming). 
Findings
The research team used 
employment and wage data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001 
to 2016 to compare the labor market 
dynamics of the cities and states with 
mandates to “synthetic” control cities 
and states over time. The research 
assessed mandates in nine cities 
(including San Francisco, Washington, 
D.C., and New York City) and four 
states (Connecticut, California, 
Massachusetts, and Oregon).
The synthetic control group method 
(SCGM) is a relatively recent statistical 
method that allows researchers to draw 
causal inference. In this specific case, to 
benchmark the labor market dynamics 
of cities and states that implemented 
a mandate, the SCGM produces a 
very similar synthetic control group 
consisting of fractions of similar 
counties and states. 
Figure 1 illustrates the SCGM 
and some select findings. The left 
column shows the findings for three 
areas—San Francisco, King County, 
and New York City. The right column 
shows the findings for three select 
states, California, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon. The x-axis represents the 
normalized timeline in months up 
to and since the mandates became 
effective, and the y-axis shows the 
NOTE
1. Oakland rent control ordinance. https: 
//oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail 
.aspx?ID=2680738&GUID=BAED7BF3 
-ED56-4A16-A876-37717D4E01D6& 
Options=&Search= (accessed January 11, 
2019).
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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Over the past decade, dozens of cities, eleven states, and the District of Columbia 
have passed sick leave legislation.
n Sick pay mandates allow employees to earn and accumulate one hour of paid sick 
leave credit per 30–40 working hours.
n Comparing employment and wage dynamics in cities and states that mandated 
sick pay with synthetic control regions, there is no evidence that the mandates lead to 
major disruptions of local labor markets.
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The article draws on research from the forthcoming 
working paper, “Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing 
Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in 
San Francisco,” published by the Upjohn Institute.
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-296
Rent Control—Is the Cure Worse 
Than the Disease?
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Figure 1  Employment Dynamics in Regions with Sick Pay Mandates Relative to Synthetic Control Regions
SOURCE: Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming).
NOTES: The solid vertical lines indicate the months when the mandates became effective, whereas the dashed vertical lines to the left indicate when the 
law was passed, and the dashed vertical lines to the right indicate when the “accrual period” was over.  Originally published in the Journal of Human 
Resources (forthcoming). © 2018 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Reprinted courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Press.
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outcome measure of interest—in this 
case, the number of private sector jobs 
as a share of the total population. The 
blue lines illustrate the private sector 
job development for the “treated” cities 
and states that implemented a mandate, 
and the orange lines illustrate the 
employment dynamics for the synthetic 
control counties or states. 
An important condition for the 
SCGM to produce valid findings is that 
the synthetic control group provides a 
valid imitation of the treatment group 
in premandate months; in other words, 
the solid and the dashed lines should 
match as closely as possible in the 
months before the mandates became 
effective. As seen, this is the case for all 
cities and states evaluated. Technical 
details aside, the difference in the 
outcome for postmandate months then 
illustrates the impact of the sick pay 
mandate on employment dynamics of 
the city or state.
As Figure 1 shows, there is little 
evidence that employment dynamics 
systematically either improved or 
worsened after the introduction of a 
sick pay mandate. The graphs look 
very similar when assessing the impact 
on wage growth in cities and states 
with sick pay mandates and when 
investigating specific industries, such 
as construction or hospitality. More 
details and results are in Pichler and 
Ziebarth (forthcoming). 
When carrying out formal 
statistical tests about the difference 
in employment and wage dynamics 
in treatment and synthetic control 
regions, these tests cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no differences at 
conventional statistical levels. However, 
the statistical tests cannot exclude 
modest reductions in wage growth and 
employment with absolute statistical 
certainty, but nor do they find any 
evidence for them.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The United States is one of three 
OECD countries without universal 
access to paid sick leave. Opponents 
of sick pay mandates are mainly 
concerned with negative employment 
or wage effects. Yet, there is no strong 
evidence of systematic and disruptive 
labor market effects when cities and 
states mandate that employees have 
the right to earn and take sick days. 
Concerns of massive labor market 
disruptions are vastly overstated. 
The absence of major labor market 
disruptions may be a function of how 
the U.S. mandates are designed. In 
fact, they seem to be more incentive-
compatible than their European 
counterparts and minimize shirking 
behavior, a main concern of opponents. 
The reason for this incentive-
compatibility is that paid sick days are 
personalized, and employees “earn” 
them. For every 30–40 hours worked—
that is, for every full-time week of 
work—employees earn one hour of 
paid sick leave. Unused sick days roll 
over to the next year. Because earned 
sick days represent a personalized 
insurance credit (similar to health 
savings accounts) for future health 
shocks that are likely to occur (e.g., flu 
or illness of a child), we expect shirking 
to play a minimal role for most 
employees. 
However, wages and employment 
could still be significantly affected 
because of administrative burdens or 
psychological effects when employers 
overestimate the actual relevance 
for their businesses. The findings in 
Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming), 
however, show that this was very 
likely not the case. They are able to 
exclude employment losses of more 
than 2 percent and wage reductions of 
more than 3 percent at conventional 
statistical levels.
Together with research showing that 
influenza-like illness rates decrease as 
a result of the mandates (Pichler and 
Ziebarth 2017), this finding suggests 
that the mandates can be an effective 
tool to increase workers’ health and 
well-being. 
NOTE
1. For an overview, see https://www 
.abetterbalance.org/paid-sick-time-laws/ 
(accessed January 11, 2019).
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We do not find evidence that sick pay 
mandates kill jobs or systematically 
disrupt local labor markets.
